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B. SPECIFIC ISSUES FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Trial Court Err in Failing to Grant

Plaintiffs Own Motion for Summary Judgment Since
Plaintiff Submitted to the Bank a Proper Demand on
a Letter of Credit, Which Demand was Never
Withdrawn or Revoked, and Should Have Been
Honored?
Standard of Review:

Correctness.

Young,

supra.
Citation
Record

II.

to Record Showing Issue Preserved.

(,fR,f) 273-275, 287.

Did the Trial Court Err in Finding that

Plaintiff's Letters Instructing the Bank to Hold
the Proceeds of the Letter of Credit Were
Withdrawals of the Prior Demand for Payment of the
Letter of Credit?
Standard of Review:

Correctness.

Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-a-Car, 845 P.2d
1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1992) cert, den. 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved.
R-192-197, 269-271, 287.
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III. Did the Trial Court Err in Finding that the
Letter of Credit Expired Before Plaintiff Made
Demand on That Letter?

By Failing to Give Coyne

Notice of Any Problem Until After the Letter of
Credit Had Allegedly Expired, Is the Bank Estopped
From Now Claiming Expiry?
Standard of Review:

Correctness.

Texaco

Inc. v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942, 949
(Utah 1994) .
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved.
R-192-193, 271-273, 287.
IV.

Did the Trial Court Err by Not Finding that

the Bank Failed to Comply with the Requirements of
the UCP Which Were Part of the Letter of Credit?
As a Result Is the Bank Estopped From Claiming
Plaintiff May Not Recover Under the Letter of
Credit?
Standard of Review:

Correctness.

East

Jordan Irrigation Company v. Morgan. 860 P.2d
310, 312 (Utah 1993).
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved.
R-192-193, 271-273, 287.
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V.

Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Allow

Plaintiff's Request for Oral Argument on the
Summary Judgment Issue?
Standard of Review:

Correctness.

Matter of

Estate of Anderson. 821 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).
Citation to Record Showing Issue Preserved.
R-98# 277-278, 287.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
I.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-5-116(3):

Except where the beneficiary has effectively
assigned his right to draw or his right to proceeds,
nothing in this section limits his right to transfer or
negotiate drafts or demands drawn under the credit.
II.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-9-306(l)

"Proceeds11 includes whatever is received upon the
sale, lease, exchange, collection or other disposition
of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason
of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except
to the extent that it is payable to a person other than
a party to the security agreement. Money, checks,
deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds."
All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds."
III. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4501(3).
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on
the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of
filing the principal memorandum in support of or in
opposition to a motion may file a written request for a
hearing.
4

(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the
motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of
the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party.
IV. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (1983 Revision), International Chamber of
Commerce Publication No. 400 ("UCP"), Article 16.
(d) If the issuing bank decides to refuse the
documents, it must give notice to that effect without
delay by telecommunication or, if that is not possible,
by other expeditious means, to the bank from which it
received the documents (the remitting bank) or to the
beneficiary, if it received the documents directly from
him. Such notice must state the discrepancies in
respect of which the issuing bank refuses the documents
and must also state whether it is holding the documents
at the disposal of, or is returning them to the
presentor (remitting bank or beneficiary as the case
may be). . .
(e) If the issuing bank fails to act in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (c) and
(d) of this article and/or fails to hold the documents
at the disposal of, or to return them to, the
presentor, the issuing bank shall be precluded from
claiming that the documents are not in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the credit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Coyne International Enterprises Corp.,

d/b/a Coyne Textile Services ("Coyne") brings this action against
the Bank, asserting that the Bank should be ordered to honor and
pay to Coyne the full proceeds of a certain letter of credit

5

("Letter of Credit") issued by the Bank in favor of Coyne in the
sum of $33,000.00.

Both Coyne and the Bank filed motions for

summary judgment in the District Court proceeding.

Coyne also

filed a reguest for oral argument with respect to its motion for
summary judgment. Coyne appeals from the Order of the District
Court granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying
Coyne's motion for summary judgment and reguest for oral
argument.
The lower court order is dated July 17, 1995 and was
signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge, of the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of
Utah.

On August 16, 1995, Coyne timely filed its appeal from the

District Court order.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

By a Lease Agreement dated August 1, 1983, Coyne

had a leasehold interest in a Learjet 2 5D airplane,
manufacturer's serial no. 3 62, United States registration no.
N52CT (currently N717CW), together with two General Electric
CJ610-8A engines, manufacturer serials nos. E-211300A and E211302A respectively.

R-245.

(The Learjet airplane and the

motors are collectively referred to as the "Aircraft" throughout
this appellant's brief).

6

2.

On or about June 24, 1992, Coyne and Avstan, L.C.,

("Avstan"), a Utah limited liability company which is not a party
to this action, entered into a Sublease Agreement ("Sublease").
In the Sublease Coyne, as lessee, agreed to sublease the Aircraft
to Avstan, as sublessee. R-222-245.
3.

As part of the transaction involving the Sublease,

on or about June 24, 1992, Stanley R. Pope, an individual
("Pope"), and Stanco, Inc., a Utah corporation ("Stanco") signed
and delivered a guaranty to Coyne, by which both Pope and Stanco
guaranteed "full and prompt performance and payment of all
obligations. . ." which Avstan owed to Coyne under the Sublease.
R-218-219.
4.

Paragraph 4(c) of the Sublease provided that Avstan

would provide an irrevocable letter of credit in the sum of
$33,000 in favor of Coyne, which letter of credit would be
security for Avstan's obligation to make rental payments under
the Sublease.

R-242.

Bank was to issue the irrevocable letter

of credit in favor of Coyne. Id.
5.

On or about June 23, 1992, Bank issued its

Irrevocable Letter of Credit no. 005248 ("Letter of Credit") in
favor of Coyne. R-91; Addendum "A." The Letter of Credit was
payable to Coyne in its full face amount of $33,000 upon Bank's
receipt of a written statement on Coyne's letterhead, signed by
7

an officer of Coyne, that Pope had " . . . not fulfilled the term
of the contract . . . " relating to the Sublease.

R-91, 216;

Addendum "A."
6.

The Letter of Credit also contained the following

language:
This Credit is Subject to the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (1983 Revision).
International Chamber of Commerce. Publication No.
400.
Id.

(The language of the relevant portions of the UCP is

contained on pages 4-5 of this brief.

The full text of the

Letter of Credit is contained in Addendum "A."
7.

By letter dated May 24, 1993, Coyne gave the Bank

the written notice required by the Letter of Credit that Pope had
defaulted on the terms of the contract relating to the Sublease.
R-89, 103, 209; Addendum "B." The Letter of May 24, 1993 was
written on Coyne's corporate letterhead and was prepared and
signed by one of Coynes officers.

Id.

Through the testimony of

one of its authorized officers, the Bank admits that the Letter
of May 24, 1993 was a demand on the Letter of Credit.
8.

R-70, 95.

The Bank never informed Coyne that the Letter of

May 24, 1993 was not a sight draft or that the letter in any way
failed to comply with the actual requirements for a presentation
of demand required by the terms of the Letter of Credit. R-105106, 249.

Neither did the Bank ever tell Coyne that either the
8

form or content of the demand contained in the Letter of May 24,
1993 was in any way nonconforming, inadequate or defective9.

Id.

On or about May 28, 1993, and four days after Coyne

had made the May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of Credit, Coyne's
New York counsel wrote a letter to the Bank.

In that Letter of

May 28, 1993 Coyne's counsel informed the Bank:
fT]he proceeds of the letter of credit are not to
be paid as directed in Mr. Ryan's demand of May 25,
1993 (sic)1 and that you should hold the proceeds until
you receive further instructions from this office.
R-79, 102, 214. Addendum "C" (emphasis added).
10.

The text of the Letter of May 28, 1995 simply

instructed the Bank to "hold the proceeds" of the Letter of
Credit on which Coyne had made earlier demand.

The May 28, 1993

Letter does not use words or terms such as "withdraw," "cancel"
or "revoke" with respect to Coyne's earlier May 24, 1993 demand
made on the Letter of Credit.
11.

Id.

On or about June 1, 1993 one of Coyne's officers

wrote the Bank and informed it:
As is set forth in Mr. O'Hara's (Coyne's New York
counsel) letter of May 28, 1993, you are authorized to
hold the proceeds of the above referenced letter of
Although Coyne's counsel writes that Coyne's demand letter is
dated May 25, 1993, the actual correct date of Coyne's demand on
the Letter of Credit is evident from the date the Letter of May 24,
1993 bears. Coyne's counsel had written Pope a letter on May 25,
1993 and appears to have incorrectly written that both his letter
and Coyne's demand on the Letter of Credit were dated May 25, 1993.
9

credit until you receive further instructions from Mr.
O'Hara.
R-77, 101, 207; Addendum "D" (emphasis added).
12.

As was the case with the Letter of May 28, 1993,

the Letter of June 1, 1993 simply informed the Bank to hold the
Letter of Credit's proceeds until further instruction.

Nothing

in the Letter of June 1, 1993 uses the words "withdraw", "cancel"
or "revoke" in reference to Coyne's earlier demand on the Letter
of Credit.

Id.

13.

At the time the Letters of May 28, 1993 and

June 1, 1993 were written, Coyne believed that on account of its
earlier demand on the Letter of Credit, the Bank had already
reduced the Letter of Credit to proceeds.
14.

R-171, 172, 248.

Coyne's Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1, 1993

were written because the Sublease provided for an arbitration
proceeding in the event there were a dispute between Coyne, Pope,
Stanco and/or Avstan.
in favor of Coyne.

That arbitration proceeding was resolved

Shortly after the arbitration proceeding

resolution, Coyne's counsel wrote the Bank on October 25, 1993
and informed it:
[W]e are now instructing you to forward the
entire proceeds of the letter of credit in the amount
of $33,000 to [Coyne's counsel].
R-72-73, 99-100, 211-212; Addendum "E" (emphasis added).
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15.

At no time between May 20, 1993 and October 25,

1993 did the Bank ever inform Coyne in writing or otherwise that
the Bank claimed either the Letter of May 28, 1993 or the Letter
of June 1, 1993 revoked, rescinded, canceled or withdrew Coyne's
earlier May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of Credit. R-105-106,
249-250.

Nor did the Bank ever timely inform Coyne that the Bank

claimed the Letter of Credit had expired without a proper demand
having been made on the Letter of Credit.
16.

R-105-106, 249.

At no time prior to the time Coyne filed its

complaint did the Bank ever inform or otherwise notify Coyne that
Zions had not reduced the Letter of Credit to proceeds or that
the Bank would not hold the proceeds of the Letter of Credit as
requested by Coyne. R-248.
17.

In the proceeding before the District Court, Coyne

moved for summary judgment.

R-98-99.

Included in Coyne's motion

for summary judgment was a request for oral argument.

Id.

After

all memoranda had been filed, Coyne filed its notice to submit
the summary judgment motions for decision.

Included in that

notice was a reference to Coyne's request for oral argument.

R-

277-278.
18.

In the District Court's memorandum decision dated

May 30, 1995, the Court simply held:
Oral Argument is denied." R-280;
11

"Plaintiff's Request for

See also similar language in

the order.

R-283.

In neither the memorandum decision nor in the

formal order implementing the memorandum decision did the
District Court make any finding that Coyne's motion for summary
judgment was frivolous or that the issues raised by Coyne in its
motion for summary judgment had been previously and conclusively
determined by a prior decision of a Utah court.

R-279-281; 283.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT COYNE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON COYNE'S TIMELY DEMAND ON THE
LETTER OF CREDIT AND THE BANK'S FAILURE TO GIVE ANY NOTICE
OF NONCOMPLIANCE.
In matters involving an issuer of a letter of credit

(i.e. Bank) and the beneficiary of the letter (i.e. Coyne), the
issuer must simply look to the credit documents and not to the
merits of the underlying transaction between its customer (i.e.
Pope, Avstan and Stanco) and the beneficiary.

Newvector

Communications, Inc. v. Union Bank, 663 F.Supp 252, 255, 256
(footnote 16)(D.C. Utah 1987) Utah Code, Section 70A-5-114(1).
Coyne submitted a proper, conforming demand on the Letter of
Credit.

The demand contained in the Letter of May 24, 1993 was a

sight draft.

Coyne's demand on that letter was never withdrawn,

revoked or rescinded.

A request that an issuer hold the proceeds

of a letter of credit on which a previous demand has been made
does not constitute a withdrawal or revocation of the earlier
demand.
12

If the issuer of a letter of credit claims the demand is
nonconforming or defective it may not wait until the letter of
credit has expired before it first gives the beneficiary notice
of dishonor.

If a letter of credit issuer claims that a demand

made on a letter of credit is nonconforming, the issuer must
immediately notify the beneficiary that the issuer has rejected
the demand.

The Bank failed to give Coyne any notice of dishonor

and thereby Coyne was led to believe that its demand had been
honored by the Bank.

Also, and analogously, where an issuer

believes a beneficiary demand on a letter of credit has been
revoked or withdrawn, the issuer should be required to notify the
beneficiary that the issuer regards the demand as having been
withdrawn.

The issuer may not lull the beneficiary into

believing the demand on the letter is conforming, and then,
without warning, belatedly claim the letter of credit has already
expired.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AFFORD COYNE THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AFTER COYNE HAD MADE A TIMELY
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT PURSUANT TO THE UTAH RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
The District Court committed reversible error in not

affording Coyne the opportunity for oral argument on its motion
for summary judgment.

Unless the District Court specifically

found (and it did not so find) that Coyne's motion was frivolous
or that prior Utah law had already decided the issues raised in
13

Coyne/s motion, that court was obliged to allow Coyne the right
to have oral argument in favor of its, and against the Bank's,
motion for summary judgment,
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT COYNE'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON COYNE'S TIMELY DEMAND ON THE
LETTER OF CREDIT AND THE BANK'S FAILURE TO GIVE ANY NOTICE
OF NONCOMPLIANCE.
A.

The May 24, 1995 Letter Was a Proper, Conforming Demand
or Draw on the Letter of Credit,
The Letter of Credit's language provides:

We [the Bank] hereby establish our Irrevocable Letter
of Credit in your [Coyne's] favor for the account of
Stanley R. Pope . . . up to the aggregate amount of
USD 33,000.00 available by your draft(s) drawn at sight
on Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah
accompanied by: State on Coyne Textile Service
letternead purportedly signed by an officer of Coyne
Textile Service that Stanley R. Pope has not fulfilled
the term of contract relating to the lease of one
Learjet 25-D aircraft stating the reason, . . .
(emphasis in original)
R-91-216; Addendum "A."
The Letter of Credit required Coyne to submit no other
documents in conjunction with any draw Coyne would make on the
Letter of Credit.

Id.

On May 24, 1993, Coyne's Treasurer wrote the Bank on a
document bearing Coyne's letterhead:
This is to certify that Stanley R. Pope has not
fulfilled the terms of the contract relating to the
lease of one Learjet 25-D. Mr. Pope has defaulted in
14

the payment of rent and other amounts in excess of the
face amount of the attached letter of credit.
Please pay the entire amount of Thirty-Three Thousand
($33,000.00) Dollars to our attorney, David P. O'Hara,
at the following address:
[address omitted]
R-89, 103, 209; Addendum "B."
It is undisputed that the Bank received the May 24,
1993 demand on the Letter of Credit.

R-106-107.

It is also

undisputed that the Bank never gave Coyne any written or other
notice that the Letter of May 24, 1993 was in any way a
defective, nonconforming or inadequate draw on the Letter of
Credit.

R-105-106.
The May 24, 1993 Letter was proper in both form and

content as a demand draw on the Letter of Credit.

The Utah

Uniform Commercial Code indicates that an instrument is a draft
if it contains an order to pay.

Utah Code, Section 70A-3-104(5).

Although the specific issue does not appear to have been decided
by an appellate court in Utah, cases involving letters of credit
in other jurisdictions have held that a letter containing an
order to pay satisfies the requirements for an enforceable sight
draft under the UCC.
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 3 94 F.Supp 352
(D.C. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds 550 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir.
1977) one of the issues before the district court was whether a
15

request for payment under a letter of credit, could be a "sight
draft."

The federal district court in Pennsylvania held that a

telex which made demand for payment met the requirement of a
sight draft.

The opinion observes:

A sight draft is an order for the immediate payment of
money from a bank. In the instant case, the telex in
question contained a direction that money be
transferred to Equibank,s account at the Chase Bank in
New York. Equibank argues that this was not a demand
and, therefore, the telex could not be considered a
draft. However, Comment 2 to Section 3-102 of the
Uniform Commercial Code states: '. . . I n the case of
orders the dividing line between 'a direction to pay'
and 'an authorization or request' may not be selfevident in the occasional, unusual, and therefore noncommercial case. The prefixing of words of courtesy to
the direction—as please pay' or 'kindly pay' should
not lead to a holding that the direction has
degenerated into a mere request. . . '
Upon examination of this particular transaction,
. we conclude that the telex of April 30, 1973
meets the requirements of a sight draft. Chase
intended it to be a draft, and it was so treated by
Equibank upon receipt.
Chase Manhattan, supra 394 F.Supp. at 356.
And in Temple Eastex Incorporated v. Addison Bank, 672
S.W. 2d 793 (Tex. 1984), the Supreme Court of Texas held that
where a bank had issued an irrevocable letter of credit that was
to be honored upon the beneficiary's presentation of a sight
draft and an affidavit of default, the letter of credit
beneficiary complied by sending a demand letter on its stationary
and the affidavit of default.

The Texas court cited with
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approval the Texas Appellate Court decision in Travis Bank &
Trust v. State, 660 S.W. 2d 851 (Tex. App. 1983), which held that
where a letter of credit did not define the term "draft," a
beneficiary could make proper demand on the letter of credit by
presenting a simple letter demanding payment.

Temple Eastex

supra, 672 S.W. 2d at 796-797 (citing Travis supra, 660 S.W.2d at
854-855.

In Temple Eastex the court concluded:

We hold the demand for payment and accompanying
documents sent to the bank constituted "drafts" as that
term was contemplated by the parties and as that term
is usually interpreted when used in letters of credit.
Temple Eastex supra, 672 S.W.2d at 798.

See also Titanium Metals

Corporation of America v. Space Metals, Inc., 529 P.2d 431 (Utah
1974)(case involving course of dealings excusing submission of
draft under the circumstances of that case).
In the case before this Court, the Letter of Credit did
not define the term "sight draft."

However, the Letter of May

24, 1993 contained a clear demand for payment.

That letter

specifically referred to the Letter of Credit, gave the required
notice of default in the form set out in the Letter of Credit.
The demand for payment in the Letter of May 24, 1993 was for a
sum certain.

That letter was prepared, signed, submitted to and

received by the Bank long before any expiry of the Letter of
Credit.

The Bank never objected to either the form, content or

timing of the May 24, 1993 Letter.
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The Bank never gave notice

that demand was nonconforming or defective. R-105-106.

Under the

reasoning of Chase Manhattan and Temple Eastex that letter was
effective as a sight draft made upon the Letter of Credit.
B.

AN INSTRUCTION TO HOLD PROCEEDS OF A LETTER OF CREDIT
DOES NOT AND CANNOT REASONABLY BE CONSTRUED TO
CONSTITUTE A REVOCATION, WITHDRAWAL OR CANCELLATION OF
AN EARLIER DEMAND MADE ON THE LETTER OF CREDIT.
In Coynes Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1, 1993, it

or its attorney simply advised the Bank to hold the proceeds of
the Letter of Credit.

R-77, 79, 101-102, 207, 214; Addenda "C"

and "D." Nothing in either of those letters uses the words
"revoke", "cancel", "rescind" or "withdraw."

Each of those

letters was written after the May 24 demand on the letter had
already been written to and received by the Bank. R-254.

The

pivotal issue in this case is whether a request to "hold the
proceeds" of a letter of credit, can or should operate to revoke
or rescind the prior demand Coyne had made on that letter of
credit.
The term "proceeds" has a long standing, consistent
commercial definition under both statutory and common law.2

Slack's Law Dictionary (West ed. 1951), p. 1369, defines
"proceeds" as: Issues; income; yield; receipts; produce; money or
articles or other thing of value arising or obtained by the sale of
property; the sum, amount, or value of property sold or converted
into money or into other property, (citation omitted)(emphases
added).
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"Proceeds" is specifically defined in the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code as follows:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale,
lease, exchange, collection or other disposition of
collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of
loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to
the extent that it is payable to a person other than a
party to the security agreement. Money, checks,
deposit accounts, and the like are "cash proceeds."
All other proceeds are "noncash proceeds."
Utah Code, Section 70A-9-306(l);

See also, Insley Manufacturing

Corporation v. Draper Bank and Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Utah
1986).
In the Tenth Circuit decision In re Hastie, 2 F.3d 1042
(10th Cir. 1993), that court made the following observations with
respect to the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of proceeds:
fl

[P]roceeds" are defined as "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other
disposition of the collateral or proceeds." (citing 9306(1) of the Code). With respect to this definition,
the term "sale" may be defined generally as '[a]
revenue transaction where goods or services are
delivered to a customer in return for cash or a
contractual obligation to pay. [The] [t]erm
comprehends [a] transfer of property from one party to
another for valuable recompense. Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th ed. at 1200 (1979). Similarly, the
term "exchange" may be defined as "[the] [a]ct of
giving or taking one thing for another,' Id. at 505,
and the term "collect" in the context of a debt or
claim may be defined as 'payment or liquidation of it,"
Id. at 238. Lastly, the phrase "other disposition" may
be defined generally as the [a]ct of disposing; [or]
transferring to the care or possession of another; [or]
[t]he parting with, alienation of, or giving up [of]
property. Id. at 423.
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Hastie supra, 2 F.3d at 1045.

See also. In the Matter of Muncrer,

495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1974), (. . .the word "proceeds" is
to be given a flexible and broad content).
Applying the language of Section 70A-9-306(l) of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code defining "proceeds" and the
definitions in Hastie as to "exchanges,""collections,"
"transfers" and "other dispositions" of proceeds, the intangible
contract rights Coyne had in the Letter of Credit became,
proceeds generated by an exchange, collection, transfer, or other
disposition, upon Coyne's May 24, 1993 demand to the Bank on the
Letter of Credit.

Coyne's demand fully complied with the

specific terms and requirements set forth in the Letter of
Credit.

The Bank did not object to the form or content of the

demand.

Having made a timely and proper demand, Coyne had every

reason to believe, first that its demand had been accepted, and
second, that by exchange, transfer or other disposition, the
Letter of Credit's $33,000.00 face amount had been reduced to
proceeds.

Such was certainly Coyne's understanding.

R-171, 172,

248.
In addition to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code Section
70A-9-306(1), that portion of the Code dealing specifically with
letters of credit makes a clear distinction between drawing on a
letter of credit and the right to the letter of credit's proceeds
20

after such proceeds have been generated.

Section 70A-5-116(3) of

the Utah Code provides:
Except where the beneficiary has effectively assigned
his right to draw or his right to proceeds nothing in
this Section limits his rights to transfer or negotiate
drafts of demands drawn under the credit, (emphasis
added).
The above cited section of the Utah Code recognizes
that a draw or demand made on a letter of credit is a separate
matter from the right to receive the letter of credit's proceeds.
By distinguishing between draws and proceeds, Section 70A-5116(3) recognizes that a right to proceeds is not synonymous with
a right to draw.

And at least by implication, that section

acknowledges that action taken with respect to a right to receive
a letter of credit's proceeds is not the same as the right to
draw on the letter.

In light of Section 70A-5-116(3) it is

difficult to understand how the Bank can possibly claim that a
request to hold proceeds somehow operated as a revocation,
withdrawal or rescission of the earlier demand made on the Letter
of Credit itself.
In light of the statutory and case law definitions of
proceeds, the timing of Coyne's letters of May 28, 1993 and June
1, 1993, which in very narrow terms simply instructed the Bank to
hold the proceeds, the language of 70A-5-116(3) which draws
distinction between a right to draw and a right to proceeds, and
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the absence of any words of revocation, withdrawal or rescission
in the Letters of May 28, 1993 and June 1# 19933, the only
reasonable interpretation of the language in Coyne's letters to
the Bank is that Coyne instructed the Bank to hold the proceeds
of the Letter of Credit and not to revoke or withdraw the earlier
demand made on the credit itself.
C.

BY FAILING TO GIVE COYNE NOTICE OF ANY PROBLEM WITH ITS
DEMAND ON THE LETTER OF CREDIT UNTIL AFTER THAT LETTER
HAD ALLEGEDLY EXPIRED, THE BANK IS NOW ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING EXPIRY.
Since Coyne made a proper and timely demand on the

Letter of Credit, and since the Letters of May 28 and June 1,
1993 did not revoke or withdraw the earlier demand, the district
court erred in holding that the Letter of Credit expired before
Coyne made its demand on the Letter of Credit.

In addition,

under the facts of this case, the Bank's failure to timely notify
Coyne that its demand was nonconforming or that the Bank believed
that Coyne's demand had been withdrawn, estops the Bank from now
raising the expiry issue.

By failing to give Coyne any notice

whatever until after the Bank claimed the Letter of Credit had
expired, the Bank lulled Coyne into thinking that Coyne's demand
3

The Letter of May 28, 1993 was written by Coyne's lawyer, to
whom the word "proceeds" would have a definite legal meaning. Had
he intended to cancel the demand, the term "hold the proceeds"
would be an odd nomenclature for an attorney. Had he wanted to
cancel, withdraw or rescind the letter, words using those terms
would have more clearly announced that purpose.
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on the letter had been accepted and that the Bank was holding the
proceeds of the letter according to Coyne,s request.

R-105, 248.

Cases which have decided analogous issues have estopped banks
from raising defenses which were asserted for the first time at
or after the expiry date of the applicable letter of credit.
In Crocker Commercial Services, Inc. v. Countryside
Bank, 538 F.Supp. 1360 (D.C. 111. 1981), a beneficiary of a
letter of credit sued the issuing bank for wrongful dishonor of a
demand made upon a letter of credit.

The bank waited until after

the letter of credit had already expired before informing the
beneficiary that the documents in its demand were nonconforming.
The federal district court granted the beneficiary/s motion for
summary judgment, noting:
Bank's conduct may fairly be viewed as creating
either a waiver or estoppel, for it stood by silently
and permitted the Letter of Credit to run out, even
though an identification of the claimed deficiencies
would have enabled Crocker to cure them.
*

*

*

For that reason the failure to make timely objection is
a waiver of any curable flaws in the beneficiary's
demand. Had Bank voiced its objections to Crocker at
any time through January 20 [the expiry date], Crocker
could have cured the hypertechnical language
difficulties now relied upon by Bank.
Crocker supra. 538 F.Supp. at 1363.
In Marino Industries v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A., 686
F.2d 112 (2d Cir 1982), the beneficiary sued the bank on several
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letter of credit transactions.

With respect to one of those

transactions it appeared that certificates of inspection were to
be submitted as part of the demand on the letter.

The

beneficiary submitted the certificates before the letter of
credit expired, but the bank waited until after the expiration
date before returning the certificates.

The Circuit Court wrote:

A further problem with respect to the certificates of
inspection is presented by the fact that Chase waited a
month-and-a-half before returning them to Marino for
correction. Under article 8(d) of the Uniform Customs
& Practice for Documentary Credits, Chase had "a
reasonable time" within which to examine the
documentation [citation omitted]. If Chase had
returned the certificates promptly, Marino would have
had ample time to correct any deficiencies. By not
returning the certificates until after the letter had
expired, Chase made it impossible for Marino to correct
any deficiencies and still make timely presentation
[citations omitted].
Marino Industries supra, 686 F.2d at 118.
l n Integrated Measurement Systems, Inc. v.
International Commercial Bank of China, 757 F.Supp. 938 (D. 111.
1991), the federal district court granted summary judgment
against a beneficiary on letters of credit.

The letter of credit

required presentation of certain documents before the letter
would be honored.

The letter was subject to the UCP.

Nearly

three weeks before the expiry of the letter, the beneficiary
submitted its documents.

The bank waited until after the letter
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had expired before returning the documents for alleged
noncompliance.

The court decided against the banks, holding:

Under UCP Art. 16 Banks are estopped from arguing
nonconformity by reason of the failure to give
Integrated Measurement timely notice of the defects.
International Bank received Integrated Measurement's
documents on March 10 and did not notify Integrated
Measurement of its objections until March 30—fully 20
days later and, indeed, five days after the credit had
expired, so that Integrated Measurement was precluded
from curing the defect.
Integrated Measurement supra, 757 at 947 (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, the Bank never informed Coyne that
the Bank claimed Coyne's May 24, 1993 demand on the Letter of
Credit was nonconforming or defective.

The Bank never informed

Coyne that it would not hold the proceeds of the Letter of Credit
as requested in the May 28 and June 1, 1993 Letters.

The Bank

allowed the expiry date on the Letter of Credit to pass without
giving Coyne any written or other response to either the demand
or the requests to hold the proceeds.

R-105-106, 248-249.

In Crocker, Marino and Integrated Measurement the
courts held that a bank's belated responses to the beneficiary,
given only after the letters of credit had expired, were
ineffective and estopped the bank from claiming defects or
nonconformance with respect to the demand on the letter of
credit.

But in those cases at least a response was given.

Prior

to the time it filed suit, Coyne never received any information
25

nor was it given any indication that its demand on the letter had
not been accepted nor that the Bank had not honored the request
to hold the proceeds.

R-248-249.

See also R-105-106.

The Bank's failure to give timely notice to Coyne that
the demand was ineffective or that the Bank would not hold the
proceeds of the Letter of Credit greatly prejudiced Coyne.

In

the absence of notice from the Bank that the Bank was not holding
the proceeds, Coyne was lulled into the reasonable belief that
there was no need to do anything further with respect to the
Letter of Credit until after the arbitration matter was
terminated.

The Bank waited until months after the expiry date

and indeed after suit was filed before revealing to Coyne that it
had not held the proceeds as requested by Coyne. R-248-249.

Even

after the October 25, 1993 Letter, the Bank still never gave
Coyne timely notice that it would not honor the Letter of Credit.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROVISIONS OF THE UCP ESTOP THE BANK FROM FAILING TO
HONOR THE LETTER OF CREDIT.
The Letter of Credit provided it was governed by the

terms of the UCP then in effect.

R-91, 216.

Addendum "A."

As

quoted above, Article 16 of the UCP which governed the Letter of
Credit requires an issuing bank that intends to refuse documents
submitted with a demand, as not conforming, to give the presentor
or beneficiary "notice to that effect without delay" of the
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dishonor.

UCP 16(d).

The notice must contain a description of

the alleged discrepancies and inform the appropriate party that
the bank will hold the documents at the disposal of the presentor
or return the documents.

Id.

If the bank fails to do so, it is

precluded from claiming nonconformance of the documents. UCP
16(e). In the case before this Court, the Bank did nothing.
Cases which have arisen under the UCP have held that
where the issuing bank fails to promptly object to alleged
nonconforming demands on a letter of credit, the bank is estopped
from raising the defense of nonconformance.

In Kerr-McGee

Chemical Corporation v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
872 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1989), the beneficiary of a letter of
credit sued the successor of an issuing bank.

The bank had

failed to timely specify alleged defects in the documents
presented when demand was made. As in the case here, the letter
of credit in Kerr-McGee provided it was subject to the 1983
revision of the UCP.

Kerr-McGee supra, 872 F.2d at 973. The

Eleventh Circuit held that since the credit was governed by the
UCP, the issuing bank's failure to allege and identify the
supposed defects in the demand on the letter of credit estopped
the bank from later relying on such defects as grounds for
avoiding payment.

In the course of the opinion the court held:

We think this provision [UCP Article 16(e)] makes
plain that a bank will be estopped from subsequent
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reliance on a ground for dishonor if it did not specify
that ground in its initial dishonor.
Id.
Later in the opinion the court noted:
The 1983 UCP provides that the bank must state its
reason for dishonor, and that failure to state these
reasons will preclude a later claim of discrepancy.
UCP Art. 16e. It is true that courts have varying
approaches to the application of estoppel to letter of
credit transactions. This fact is not relevant,
however where the parties have explicitly incorporated
the 1983 UCP in the letter of credit.
Kerr-McGee supra, 872 F.2d at 974.
In Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986), an issuing bank brought suit
against a confirming bank for wrongful dishonor of a letter of
credit.

The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of

the confirming bank on grounds that the issuing bank gave
untimely notice of document noncompliance.

The letter of credit

was governed by the then applicable version of the UCP.

After

considering what it deemed to be the relevant issues in the
matter the court concluded:
We hold, therefore, that Cochin's delay in specifying
the defects estopped it from asserting that the
documents did not comply with the letter of credit, and
that Cochin's two-week delay in notifying MHT [the
confirming bank] of its intent to return the documents
precludes this suit.
Bank of Cochin, 808 F.2d at 213.
686 F.2d at 118.
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See alsof Marino Industries,

Applying the rationale of the Kerr-McGee and Bank of
Cochin cases, each of which involved letters of credit which were
governed by the provisions of the UCP, to the case now before
this Court, the Bank's failure to give Coyne any notice, let
alone timely notice, that the demand on the Letter of Credit was
nonconforming or that the Bank would not hold the proceeds of
that credit contractually estops the Bank from raising any
alleged defect or deficiency in the demand, the Letters of May
28, and June 1, 1993 and/or the Letter of October 25, 1993.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW COYNE'S
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
As cited earlier, Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of

Judicial Administration provides that where the granting of a
motion would dispose of all or part of an action, either party
may file a written request for hearing.

That motion for oral

argument is to be made at the time of filing a party 7 s principal
memorandum.

Id.

Subpart (c) of Rule 4-501(3) provides that the

request for oral argument shall be granted unless the underlying
motion is either frivolous or unless the dispositive issues
relevant to the motion have previously been authoritatively
decided.
In the instant case, Coyne filed its request for oral
argument at the time of its original motion for summary judgment.
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R-97-98.

The district court's memorandum decision and its formal

order granting the Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying
Coyne's motion for summary judgment and request for oral argument
simply denied the request for oral argument.

R-279-2814.

The

district court entered no finding that Coyne's motion for summary
judgment was frivolous.
"G".

Id.

See also. Addendum "F" and Addendum

Neither did the district court cite any prior controlling

or authoritative decision which was adverse to the positions
urged by Coyne. Id.

Insofar as Coyne has been able to determine,

the issues raised in this appeal are matters of first impression
for a Utah court.
Coyne has found no Utah case authority interpreting the
language or scope of Rule 4-501(3)(b)-(c).

However, from the

statute's plain language the right to oral argument appears
mandatory unless the court finds the motion is frivolous or
resolved by prior controlling authority.

Subsection (c) states:

Such request [for oral argument] shall be granted
unless the court finds that (a) the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the
dispositive issue or set of issues governing ;the
granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided, (emphasis supplied).

4

The entire memorandum decision and order granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment and request for oral argument are included as
Addendum "F" and Addendum "G" respectively.
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In a sister state decision State ex rel. Frohnmaver v.
Bicar, Inc. 850 P.2d 1163 (Ore App. 1993) the defendant moved to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint.

In conjunction with that motion

defendant requested oral argument.

The trial court denied both

the motion and the request for oral argument.
Trial Court Rules 5.050(1) provide in part:

The Oregon Uniform
"There shall be oral

argument if requested by the moving party in the caption of the
motion or by a responding party in the caption of a response."
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and
remanded the case, holding that the Oregon rule requiring oral
argument was mandatory.

In the course of the opinion the Oregon

court observed:
Oral argument offers the parties an important
opportunity to clarify arguments and to respond to the
judge's questions about the record and the legal issues
that the judge deems critical. Oral argument promotes
an understanding of the dispute that written
communication does not always duplicate. As this court
can confirm, oral argument can induce the judge to
consider or to change preliminary conclusions reached
after a review of written briefs. It also serves to
assure the public that the judge has considered the
case and is accountable for the decision. Defendants'
opportunity to appeal and seek reversal of legal errors
does not eliminate the prejudicial effect of the denial
of the opportunity for an optimal decision-making
process in the trial court. The court's refusal to
allow oral argument, as required by the UTCR 5.050(1),
was reversible error.
Bicar supra, 850 P.2d at 1165.
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Similarly, in the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in
Jensen v. Pratt, 491 P.2d 547 (Hawaii 1971) the trial court
entered summary judgment without affording opportunity for oral
argument to the party against whom the motion was granted.

On

appeal the state supreme court held that the failure to grant
oral argument, contrary to the state rule affecting summary
judgment, so strongly affected a party's right as to constitute
harmful error per se.
In reversing the trial court decision the appellate
court wrote:
We have neither a rule nor an order generally
dispensing with the requirement of oral hearings on
motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, we think
that the failure of the trial court to give the parties
an opportunity to be heard orally as required by
H.R.C.P. Rule 56(c) was reversible error.
Jensen supra. 491 P.2d at 548.4

4

In a federal court decision interpreting the scope of Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Ninth Circuit
wrote:
[I]n view of the language of Rule 56(c) , and having
in mind that the granting of such a motion disposes of
the action on the merits, with prejudice, a district
court may not, by rule or otherwise, preclude a party
from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request
when made by a party opposing the motion unless the
motion for summary judgment is denied (citation omitted)
Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Coyne respectfully urges that the reasoning of the
Oregon appellate court in Bicar is particularly pertinent here.
Both the Utah and the Oregon statutes speak in terms of mandatory
rights to oral argument if the request for such argument has been
timely raised.

The district court should have granted Coyne's

motion for oral argument and committed reversible error in not
affording Coyne the opportunity for that oral argument.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in granting the Bank's motion
for summary judgment.

It also erred in failing to grant Coyne's

motion for summary judgment.
on the Letter of Credit.
withdrawn.

Coyne made a proper, timely demand

That demand was never revoked or

In any event, the Bank failed to give timely notice

of any rejection of Coyne's demand on the Letter of Credit as
required by its contractual adoption of the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits (1983 Revision). Bank also
failed to give timely notice that it had failed to comply with
Coyne's request that the Bank hold the proceeds of the Letter of
Credit.

The District Court erred in failing to grant Coyne's

motion for summary judgment on these bases.
It was also reversible error for the trial court not to
allow Coyne the opportunity for oral argument after Coyne had
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made timely request for such oral argument consistent with the
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
Appellant Coyne requests the Court to reverse the ruling of
the District Court, remand this case, and order that judgment be
entered in favor of Appellant Coyne.
DATED this 2P^

day of December, 1995.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

rtorneys for the Plaintiff
ind Appellant,
Coyne International
Enterprises Corp. d/b/a/ Coyne
Textile Services
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ZIONS
FIRfeT NATIONAL BANK
ESTABLISHED

INTF

JATTONAL BANKING DEPARTMENT
P.O. Box 30709
Salt Laic City, Utah 84130

U.SJL

1873

Telephone: 801/524-4916
Telex: 3789475 Answerback: INTBKZIONS SLC
Swift Code: ZFNBUS55

IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT

~I
COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE
140 COURTLAND AVENUE.
SYRACUSE, NEW YORK 13221.

DATE:

JUNE 2 3 ,

LETTER OF CREDIT NO.:

L

1992

N? 005248

J

Gentlemen:
We hereby establish our Irrevocable Letter of Creditin

your favor for the account of

STANLEY R. POPE, 582 SOUTH 450 EAST, OREM, UTAH
up to the aggregate amount of

84058

USD33 , 0 0 0 . 0 0

available by your draft(s) drawn at

SIGHT

on Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah accompanied by:
STATEMENT ON COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE LETTERHEAD PURPORTEDLY SIGNED BY AN OFFICER OF
COYNE TEXTILE SERVICE THAT STANLEY R. POPE HAS NOT FULFILLED THE TERM OF CONTRACT
RELATING TO THE LEASE OF ONE LEAR JET 25-D AIRCRAFT STATING THE REASON.
PARTIAL DRAWINGS ARE PERMITTED.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

We hereby agree with drawers, endorsers and bona fide holders that all drafts drawn under and in compliance with the terms of this credit will be duly honored upon presentation and delivery of documentsas
specified to the drawee if drawn and presented for negotiation on or before AUGUST 3 1 , 1 9 9 3
at our bank.

The Amount and Date of Each Negotiation Must Be Endorsed on the Back Hereof by
the Negotiating Bank.
— — . L - 'TT„.r„.,m PiKfnrrn and Practice for Documentary Credits
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COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES
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Syracuse New Str
(315)47S-)b26

2ions First National Bank
International Banking Department
P.O. Box 30709
Salt Lake City,
BALTIMOHt. MD
6ANG0H, Mf

Ralph

Att

B£CKU;t, WV

Re:

BETSY WAYNE, KY

Nelson

Letter of credit
Number 005248

BMiSTOL. IN
BUFFALO. N>
BURLlNOlON, VI
CHArtLfcijlON. WV
CLfcVE-LANU. Ort

r " . »'A
•..__,MONT. v*v

HAZLCTOW. PA
HUNTINGTON, WV

This is to certify.that Stanley R. pope has no t
fulfilled the term of the contract relating to the lease
of one Learjet 25-D* Mr. Pope has defaulted in the
payment of rent and other amounts in excess of the fi
amount of the attached letter of credit.
please pay the entire amount of Thirty-Three
Thousand ($33,00.0*00) Dollars to our attorney- navid P.
O'w^ra, at the following address:

JOUET. il

O'Hara & Hanlon
David p. O'Hara
9 Albany Street
Cazenovia, New York 13035

LONDON, KY
LONG i&>.*HlK NY
NEWAhiV NJ
N£WBfcDI:0*D

-

PHILAUrirhl* .

Very truly yours,

PITTSBUHGH. PA
6CHENl-CrAUv

f

Coyne Textile Services

SfcAf 0 * 0 . UC
SMITHBOHO. NY
SYRACUSE. NY

.,1

i\X<

TOLEDO, OH

By:

WAY&ftbuHY. CI

<»v\^

Raymond T. Ryan
An Officer (Treasurer)

WINChtSI'EH. VM
WORCE&TXH, MA
YORK. r*A

DPO/Lh
Enclosure
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OHara&Hanlon
Attorneys at Law
Counsel:
Peter W. Mitchell

9 Albany Street
Cazenovia, Now York 13035
315-^58-8000

David P. O'H&ra
Kerry J. Henlon
Peter W. Knych
Atexaiidor Pobedinsky

Syracuse Office
One Park Place
Syracu&e, New York 13,20
315-422-5177

Of Coiinaol:
Robert G. Rite

Zions First National Ba:-,International Banking ~
P.O. Box 30709
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 1 30
IHClSUil

Re;

Letter of Credit
dumber 005248

Dear Mr. Nelson:
Textile Services . L
tn vnu a de~"V~4

,sneral counsel t : C : yne
. Raymond T. Ryan of CTS has forwarded
-referenced ^ett^r of credit.

a s I indicated in my May 25,
xer to Mr. Pope, he
has a right to object to the CTS demand on the letter of credit*
His objections are to be resolved by arbitration in Onondaga
County, New York and I am proceeding to schedule that arbitration•
As a result of Mr, Pope's objections, I an writing to
- ^ ^ou that the'proceeds of "the letter of credit are not to be
paid as directed in Mr. Ryan's demand of May 25, 1993 and that you
should hold the proceeds until you receive further instructions
from this office
i

n i ni in ni ni ni 1 1 1 I i« l I ni mi i l l il il I
V e i y I j 11

iriii't'hrniiiiii n q f r o m M r
/
1111 ni ni I11Vi

O'Hara & j f a n l o n

*' y

(/

DPO/sm
cc:
Mar'

VL::
r.

Robinsow,

* f

»4—»

u
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COYNE INTERNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES CORP

O'Hara

&

Hanlon

COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES

gxeCUTIVEOr O . Box 4854
140 Cortland Avenue
Syracuse, New Vbrk 13271
(315)475-1626

June 1, 1993

BALTIMORE. MO
BECKLtY, WV
HfcTSY LAYN'E K\
BRISTOL TN

DurrAi o NY

Zions First National Bank
International Banking Department
P.O. Box 30709
Salt Lake Citv.
0
Attn:

Ralph G. Neis -

BURLWG1 ON, V I
CHARLESTON. W J'

RE:

CLEVhLAND, OH

Letter ci w ^ -»..Number 005248

1 >VJ HOIS, PA
fRiE. PA
FAIRMONT, WV
HAZLETON, PA
HUNTINGTON. VW
JOLIET, It

As is set forth in Mr. O'Hara r s letter of May 28, 1993, you
are authorized to hold the proceeds of the above referenced
letter of credit until you receive further instructions from
Mr. O'Hara.

iEWISTON. MILONDON, KY
LONG ISLAND, NY
NEWARK. NJ
NEW BfiOf-ORD. K
PHILADELPHIA, P

Very trui y ] MHIF M,

1>AW^
Raymond T. Ryan
Chief Financial Officer

PITT50UHGH, PA
RICHMOND, VA
SCHENECTADY, Ml'
SEAFOrttJ, DE
SMITHBORO, NY
SYRACUSE. NY
TOLEDO, OH
WA1FRBURY. CI
WINCHrSTER, W
WORCESTtH, m
YOHK, PA

RTR:jmr
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O'Hara &Hanlon
Attorneys at Law
David P. O'Hara
Kerry J. Hanlon

< • ie Park Place
Syracuse, New York 13202

Peter W. Knych
Alexander Pobedinsky

Counsel:
Peter W. Mitchell

315-422-5177

Cazenovia Office
9 Albany Street
Cazenovia, New York 13035
315-655-9061

Of Counsel:
Robert G. Ritz

• October ,!bf

IMMJ

Via Certified Mail
Return Receipt Requested
Zions First National Bank
International Banking Department
P.O. Box 30709
Salt Lake City, Utah 8413 0

Re:
Dea-*

Letter of Credit No. 005248
:

This firm is general counsel to Coyne Textile Service
("CTS") the beneficiary of the above-referenced letter of cred:
As you may know, Mr. Raymond T. Ryan of CTS made a proper ~
nely demand on the letter of credit on May 24, 1993. However, as
xs set forth in my letter to the bank dated May 28, 1993, and Mr.
Ryan's letter dated June 1, 1993, copies of which are enclosed, CTS
authorized you to hold the-proceeds of the letter of credit until
you received further instructions from this office, Th I s letter
shall constitute such further instructions.
Because the pending arbitration referenced in my May 28, 1993
letter has been resolved in CTS 1 favor as evidenced by the enclosed
copy of the arbitration award, we are now instructing you to
forward the entire proceeds of the letter of credit i n the amcof $33,000.00 to the following office:
Ha lira & Hanlon
uavid P. O'Hara, Esq.
9 Albany Street
Cazenovia, New Yor«
Please be advised that w«* _.._
initiate litigation against the bank in t:
are withheld.

".^jrizeci ^ w.o
_.:at the proceeds

Mr. Dale Marcotte
October 25, 1993
Page 2
At the request of your legal counsel, William G. Marsden, we
are copying him with this letter, including enclosures.
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
O'HARA & HANLON

David P. O'Hara
DPO/sb
Enclosures
cc:

William G. Marsden, Esq.

TabF
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IN HIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CX
UTAH COUNTY, ST4TF O F UTAH
COYNE INTERNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES CORP., d/b/-~
TEXTILE SERVICES,
a New York Corporation,

. . . . . - O K * v n f . M DECISION
'NE
i \<. \ D O3Q400620

* \N* M

He ,1

»* - .

aunt Oabanilla
vs.

DEPIT\ •. t L-RK Georgia Snyder
tJAJNK,

EXTERN

Defen

Morion

Andrew Pickering

lary Judgment an*, t n .;. ;t o Motion t.-i Summary Judgment and Request for Oiv

Argument. Having received and considered Defendant's and Plaintiffs Motions, together with
memoranda in support, in opposition, and in reply to the motions, the Court hereby grants the
Defendant's motion and denies the Plaintiffs motion. The Coin t finds that although the parties
disagree on the interpretation of certain facts, that there are no matei ial facts at issue
regarding eiflin I Mi ml ml

i ll'l.tintiff* motions for si immai } ji idgment and therefore i ule s as a

matter of law.
On May 24, 1993, Plaintiff had requested a draw on a Letter of Credit which had been issued
by Defendant on June 23, 1992 Thee, in letters dated May 28, 1993, and, June 1, 1993, Plaintiff
instructed Defendant to hold the proceeds until Defendant received further instructions
arbitration was resolved in Plaintiffs fa*.o; Plaintiff
b

';" T

• -

AKIUM
f

• -

de. ' " . . ' -:mg th.r

Once

. . *» ,,
f

i «^tte*

*

!

tjdn naj

its own terms.
Plaintiff argues that the language in. the May 28th and June 1st letters, asking Defendant to
"hold the proceeds" ui itil Defendai it received further instructions, merely asked that the proceeds

4

/>fci

of the draw on the Letter of Credit be held in trust for Plaintiff, pending arbitration with the
beneficiary of the Letter of Credit, and that the letters did not withdraw Plaintiffs request for
draw on the Letter of Credit.
Defendant argues that the letters dated May 28, 1993, and June 1, 1993, sent by Plaintiffs
attorney and Plaintiff, respectively, withdrew Plaintiffs request for payment made in a letter
dated May 24, 1993. The Letter of Credit expired on August 31, 1993, and thereby rendered no
obligation to pay Plaintiff pursuant to its request for payment in a letter dated October 25, 1993.

The Court finds that, "[t]he basic rule applicable to letters of credit is that the
obligation set forth therein must be strictly construed and performed precisely in accordance with
its terms." NewVector Communications v. Union Bank, 663 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D. Utah 1987). A
crucial term of the Letter of Credit is the date of expiration.
Plaintiff attempts to impose a duty on Defendant to hold those proceeds for Plaintiff in
some kind of trust or escrow, a duty which Defendant never contracted to perform, and which the
Court finds should not be imposed.

The Letter of Credit dictated that it expired on August 31,

1993, ending Defendant's obligation to pay. Construing Plaintiffs letters as requests for putting
the proceeds of the Letter of Credit in trust circumvents Plaintiffs obligation to either demand
payment before the expiration of the Letter of Credit or request an extension or renewal thereof.
The certainty of the terms of an Letter of Credit should be preserved.
Therefore, the Court finds that the letters asking that the proceeds be held by Defendant
for Plaintiff were a withdrawal of the request for payment and a confirmation of such. Further, the
Court finds that Defendant's obligation to pay on the Letter of Credit expired on August 31, 1993,
and Defendant had no duty to honor Plaintiffs request for payment dated October 25, 1993.
Plaintiffs Request for Oral Argument is denied.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent with
the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to
submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until such order is

signed by the Court.
Dated this 30th day of May, 1995,

*«*&&*

cc:

Jennie B. Huggins, Esq.
Craig Carlile, Esq.

STATE OF UTAH

)
)SS

COUNTY OP UTAH

)

», M-C undersigned, Clerk,
Co*.^ of Utah Counw
annexed and foregou

District

TabG

'U

ii

C"

William G. Marsden (#2087)
Jennie B. Huggins (#5486)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
;.U^M-I

MAi:

COYNE INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES
CORP, d/b/a COYNE TEXTILE SERVICES,
a New York corporation,
Plaintiff,

vH

,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

/IONS F1RS1 NA11UNA1, liANk,

>^>W-1UU620CN

Defendant.

1;..

Jud^e Ray M. Harding

nawng come before the Cour'

-MM \T, I',CS to Submit for

consideration of Defendanfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment ana Request

.

.^

vrgument; the court having received and

considered the Motions, together with memoranda in support, in opposition, and in - T ! V
to the Motions; the court having determined that there are no genuine issues of maierial
fact and th:;- * u:

.'• termined

-. r

issued its Memorandum Decision, it is hereby

00

ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby
is, granted. It is further
ORDERED that the Complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment be, and hereby is,
denied. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Request for Oral Argument be, and hereby is,
denied.
DATED this /*7

day of

LtU**^.

1995.

BY THEXafcJRT-"'" *'

Approved as to form:
STATE OF UTAH

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

By:

Craig Carlile
Attorneys for Plaintiff

COUNTY OF UTAH

)
)SS
)

. toe undersigned, C l ^ k V ^ P ^ ^ ^ D C t
Coun o* Utah Countv Ul$\. « & ^ * o . '•*$£*
annaxeo anaforegoogoA \'&*?>l*J$i ;&:
' origrfial do\^uff^m oti ftte m > c
Witness
ay 01/
CARMA

000 283

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

9"^

day of June, 1995, I served the

foregoing proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT by mailing a duplicate original thereof by first-class
United States mail, postage pre-paid and addressed as follows:
Craig Carlile
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
92 North University Avenue #210
Provo, Utah 84601

tf^UsUJyUJ " Q
jbhp!559

000
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